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How has Mobile Banking Stimulated Financial Development in Africa?
Abstract
In  the  first  empirical  assessment  of  the  incidence  of  mobile  banking  on  financial 
intermediary  development  in  Africa,  we  use  two  definitions  of  the  financial  system:  the 
traditional IFS (2008) and Asongu (2011) measures of financial sector importance. When the 
conception of a financial system is based only on banks and other financial institution (IFS, 
2008),  mobile  banking  has  a  negative  incidence  on  traditional  financial  intermediary 
dynamics of depth, activity and size. However, when a previously missing informal-financial 
sector  component  is  integrated  into  the  definition  (Asongu,  2011),  mobile-banking  has  a 
positive incidence on informal financial intermediary development. Three major implications 
result  from the  findings.  (1)  There  is  a  growing  role  of  informal  finance  in  developing 
countries.  (2) The incidence  of the burgeoning phenomenon of mobile-banking cannot  be 
effectively assessed at a macroeconomic level by traditional financial development indicators. 
(3) It is a wake-up call for scholarly research on informal financial intermediary development 
indicators which will oriented monetary policy; since a great chunk of the monetary base(M0) 
in less developed countries is now captured by mobile-banking. 
JEL Classification: E00; G20; L96; O17; O33
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1. Introduction
The mobile revolution has transformed the lives of many Africans, providing not just 
communications but also basic financial access in the form of phone-based money transfer 
and  storage (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). The high growth 
and penetration rates of mobile telephony that is transforming cell phones into pocket-banks 
in Africa is providing opportunities for countries on the continent to increase affordable and 
cost effective means of bringing on board a large chunk of the population that hitherto has 
been excluded from formal financial services for decades. Such a transformation is of interest 
not only to banks and Micro Financial Institutions (MFIs) but also to governments, financial 
regulators  as  well  as  development  partners  who  are  providing  support  to  improve  the 
livelihoods of Africans through poverty reduction and sustained economic growth. 
At the Connect Africa summit in 2007, Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda asserted: 
“in ten short years, what was once an object of luxury and privilege, the mobile phone has  
become a basic necessity in Africa”(Aker & Mbiti,2010,208). An article in  The Economist 
(2008) also reported: “a device that was a yuppie toy not so long ago has now become a  
potent for economic development in the world’s poorest countries”. This paper seeks to assess 
if these sentiments and slogans reflect the reality of the consequences of mobile phone on 
financial development in Africa?
Beyond, the need to investigate these perceptions, there is a growing body of work 
pointing to the imperative of more scholarly research on a phenomenon whose time is now: 
mobile banking. To the best of our knowledge, one of the most exhaustive accounts on the 
‘mobile phone’ development literature concludes: “Existing empirical evidence on the effect  
of mobile phone coverage and services suggest that the mobile phone can potentially serve as  
a tool for economic development in Africa. But this evidence while certainly encouraging  
remains limited. First, while economic studies have focused on the effects of mobile phones  
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for particular countries or markets, there is little evidence showing that this has translated  
into macroeconomic gains…”(Aker & Mbiti,2010,224). Also, as sustained by Maurer (2008) 
and confirmed in subsequent literature (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Thacker & Wright, 2012), 
scholarly  research  on  the  adoption  and  socioeconomic  impacts  of  m-banking  (payments) 
systems in the developing world is scares. From a broad perspective, most studies on mobile-
banking have been theoretical and qualitative in nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 
2008; Merritt, 2010; Thacker & Wright, 2012). The few existing empirical works hinge on 
country-specific and micro-level data(collected from surveys) for the most part(Demombynes 
& Thegeya ,2012). 
This  paper  aims  to  assess  what  incidence  mobile  banking  has  had  on  financial 
development.  By  distinguishing  its  effect  on  formal  and  informal  financial  intermediary 
sectors, findings could have substantial policy relevance; especially on which financial sectors 
are  benefiting  most  owing  to  the  soaring  phenomenon  of  mobile  banking.  The  seminal 
character  of  this  work also  adds  to  the  literature  by proposing some hitherto  unexplored 
dimensions  of  financial  development  which  could  provide  the  much  needed  guidance  to 
policy makers on the financial development empirics of mobile banking. Our contribution to 
the literature is therefore threefold. Firstly, we complement existing theoretical literature on 
the mobile-finance nexus by providing the first macroeconomic empirical assessment of the 
incidence of the phenomenon on financial development1. Secondly, owing to the debate over 
which financial  sectors are benefiting most from mobile banking, we assess its impact by 
disentangling financial depth to include a previously missing component. Hence we are able 
to  capture  both  formal  and  informal  financial  intermediary  development  effects.  Thirdly, 
1 “Relative to the spread of some other technologies that have been introduced in sub-Saharan Africa-improved  
seeds, solar cook stoves and agricultural technology-mobile phones adoption has occurred at a staggering rate  
on the continent. Yet few empirical economic studies have examined mobile phone adoption. This could be due  
to  a  variety  of  factors,  including  unreliable  or  nonexistent  data  on  individual  level  adoption  (leading  to  
measurement error)…” Aker & Mbiti(2010;225).
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based  on  the  findings,  we  provide  relevant  measures  that  could  guide  future  search  and 
macroeconomic policy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews  existing literature. 
Data  and  methodology  are  presented  and  outlined  respectively  in  Section  3.  Empirical 
analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Existing literature 
2.1 Theoretical framework
2.1.1 Mobile penetration and finance 
According to Jonathan & Camilo(2009), most mobile transactions2 in the developing 
world enable users to do three things. (a) Store value (currency) in an account accessible via a 
handset. When the user already has a bank account, this is generally a question of linking to a 
bank account. If the user does not have an account, then the process creates a bank account for 
him/her or creates a pseudo bank account, held by a third party or the user’s mobile operator.  
(b) Convert cash into and out of the store value account. When the account is linked to a bank 
account, then users can visit banks to cash-in and cash-out. In many instances, users can also 
visit the GSM providers’ retail stores. In most flexible services, a user can visit a corner kiosk 
or grocery store (maybe the same one where he/she purchases airtime) and transact with an 
independent retailer working as an agent for the transaction system. (c) Transfer stored value 
between accounts. Users can generally transfer funds between accounts linked to two mobile 
phones,  by using a set  of SMS messages  (or menu commands)  and PIN codes.  The new 
2 In order to have a mobile money account and make a deposit, a customer must own a cell phone SIM card with 
the mobile operator and register for a mobile money account. The customer then makes cash deposits at the  
physical  offices of one of the operator‘s mobile money agents. These cash deposits create electronic money 
credit in the account. Customers can make person-to-person transfers of mobile money credit to the accounts of 
other mobile money users in the same network. They can also use their mobile money credit to pay bills and to 
buy phone airtime. Withdrawals  (conversion to cash) could be made at the offices  of the network’s mobile  
money agents. There is also a possibility for a mobile money customer to make a transfer to someone who is not 
registered with the same network. In this case,  when notice of the transfer is received through an SMS text  
message, the recipient can receive the cash at a mobile money agent (Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012).
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services offer a way to move money from place to place and present an alternative to the 
payments  system offered by banks,  pawn shops, remittance firms…etc.  The uptake of m-
banking(payments)  systems  has  been  particularly  strong  in  the  Philippines(where  three 
million customers use systems offered by mobile operators Smart & Globe;  Neville,2006); 
Kenya(where nearly two million users registered with Safaricom M-PESA  system within a 
year of its nationwide rollout, Vaughan,2007; Ivatury & Mas,2008) and South Africa where 
450, 000 people use Wizzit(‘the bank in your pocket’; Ivatury & Pickens, 2006) or one of two 
other national systems(Porteous,2007). 
Demombynes, & Thegeya(2012) have approached the mobile-finance nexus through 
the  concept  of  savings.  They  distinguish  two  types  of  mobile  savings.  (a)  Basic  mobile 
savings; which is simply the use of a standard mobile money system such as M-PESA to store 
funds.  These  basic  mobile  savings  do  not  earn  interest.  Bank-integrated  mobile  savings 
perspectives have received a great deal of attention as a way to provide banking services to 
the poor. They have the edge of offering access to basic banking services without requiring 
proximity to a physical bank branch. Hence, with a bank-integrated mobile savings account, 
basic banking services can be accessed through a network of mobile phone agents, which in 
Kenya outnumber the weight  of bank branches by a factor of 100 to 1(Mas & Radcliffe, 
2011).  The  term  ‘partially  integrated’ mobile  savings  system  is  also  used  to  describe 
situations where bank account access via mobile phones is contingent on the establishment of 
a traditional account at a physical bank. 
More so banks are beginning to build their own agent networks in order to assume a 
more  competitive  bargaining  position  in  accessing  mobile  service  platforms.  Fully  and 
partially integrated savings present different types of contracts among the partnering bank and 
mobile service provider. According to Demombynes & Thegeya(2012), on the one hand a 
partially integrated product clearly delineates the role of the bank(which provides and owns 
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banking services) from that of the mobile service provider(which provides mobile telephony 
infrastructure and controls the agent network). Thus the bank compensates the mobile service 
provider for access to the network and enjoys the remaining profits. This type of contract 
more closely looks like a debt contract between parties. On the other hand, a fully integrated 
solution may not draw the same distinction between bank and mobile service providers. In 
this case, the distribution of surplus is contingent on the relative bargaining power of the bank 
and mobile service provider. This sort of contract more closely resembles an equity contract 
between two parties. Equity-like contracts are more likely to be complex and therefore more 
difficult to negotiate than debt-like contracts, there-by presenting a potential hurdle towards 
the goal of increasing access. 
Ondiege(2010),  Chief  Economist  of  the  African  Development  Bank  looks  at  the 
mobile-finance nexus from four perspectives. Firstly, the mobile phone can serve as a virtual 
bank  card  where  customer  and  institution  information  can  be  securely  stored,  thereby 
avoiding the  cost  of  distributing  cards  to  customers.  In  fact  he postulates,  the  subscriber 
identity  module  (SIM) card  inside  most  (if  not  all)  GSM phones  is  in  itself  a  smartcard  
(similar to the virtual bank card). Therefore, the banks customer’s PIN and account number 
can  be  stored  on  this  SIM card  to  perform the  same functions  as  the  bank virtual  card. 
Secondly, the mobile phone may serve as a point of sale (POS) terminal. As such a mobile  
phone could be used to transact and communicate with the appropriate financial institution to 
solicit transaction authorization.  These are the same functions of a POS terminal at mails, 
retail or other stores. A mobile phone can duplicate these functionalities with ease. Thirdly, 
the mobile phone can also be used as an ATM. A POS is thus used to pay for goods and 
services  at  the store.  If  cash and access  to  savings  were to  be considered  as  ‘goods and 
services’, that customers buy and store, then the POS will also serve as a cash collection and 
distribution  point  which  basically  is  the  function  of  an  automatic  teller  machine(ATM). 
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Fourthly, the mobile phone may be used as an Internet banking terminal. Implying it offers 
two fundamental customer services: a) ability to make payments and transfers remotely and; 
b) instant access to any account. Hence the mobile phone device and wireless connectivity 
bring the internet terminal into the hands of otherwise unbanked customers.  
2.1.2 Instrumental variables 
In  this  section,  we  provide  theoretical  bases  to  justify  the  choice  of  instrumental 
variables for the empirical phase of the paper. Thus, we provide theoretical justification to the 
empirical  validity of legal-origins,  income-levels,  religious-dominations  and press-freedom 
qualities in the finance-growth nexus. 
In the first  strand, we highlight  the basis for legal-origin moment conditions.  This 
could  be  explained  from two  stances:  the  ‘law & finance  theory’  and  the  ‘political  and 
adaptability’ channels.  The first stance of the law and finance theory emphasizes that legal 
institutions influence corporate finance and financial development (La Porta et al., 1998). The 
law  and  finance  theory  stresses  that  cross-country  disparities  in  (i)  contract,  company, 
bankruptcy and security laws, (ii) the legal system’s emphasis on private property rights, and 
(iii)  the  efficiency  of  enforcement,  influence  the  degree  of  expropriation  and  hence  the 
confidence with which people purchase securities and take part in financial markets.  In the 
second stance we find theories by Beck et al. (2003) which assess ‘why’ legal origin matter in 
financial  development.  They examine two channels by which legal origins may influence 
financial development: the political3 and adaptability4 channels. 
3The political mechanism is premised on two standpoints.  Firstly,  legal traditions differ in the emphasis they 
attribute to protecting the rights of private investors relative to those of the state. Secondly, private property 
rights protection forms the foundation for financial development.
4 The second mechanism linking legal-origin to financial development is the adaptability channel that is also 
built  on  two  foundations.  Firstly,  legal  systems  differ  in  their  ability  to  adjust  to  changing  and  evolving  
circumstances.  Secondly,  when  a  country’s  legal  system  adapts  only  slowly  to  changing  circumstances 
(especially economic), large gaps will open between the financial needs of an economy and the ability of the  
legal system to support and fulfill those needs.
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In the second strand, we provide theoretical justification to the choice of income-level 
instrumental variables. It has been well documented that wealth-effects, play a substantial role 
in  the  finance-growth  nexus  (Beck  et  al.,  1999;  Asongu,  2011a).  From  theoretical  and 
empirical literature standpoints, considerable differences in wealth exiting across countries 
have substantial  effects on cross-country disparities in financial structure and development 
(Asongu, 2012). Theoretical justification for wealth-effects is grounded on three perspectives. 
Firstly,  financial  intermediary development  engenders:  central  banks assets  to total  assets, 
deposit money bank assets to total assets, other financial institutions’ assets to total assets and 
deposit money versus central bank assets (Beck et al.1999, p.13). According to this position, 
central  banks loose relative  importance  as  one move from low to high-income countries, 
whereas  other  financial  institutions  gain  relative  importance  in  the  process.  Conversely, 
deposit  money  banks  gain  importance  versus  central  banks  with  a  higher  income  level. 
Financial depth also increases with income levels.  Secondly, private credit and life insurance 
companies, the life insurance penetration and the life insurance density increase with GDP per 
capita. Interestingly, for the first two indicators, the lower-middle income group exhibits the 
lowest medians (Beck et al., 1999, p.21)5.  Thirdly,  there is a significant variation in size, 
activity and efficiency of stock markets across income groups. Countries with higher levels of 
GDP per capita have bigger, more active and more efficient financial markets (Beck et al.,  
1999, 25)6.
In the third  strand we lay the theoretical foundation for the empirical validity of the 
religious instruments. According to Hearn et al.(2011), Islam represents a system of beliefs 
founded on the interpretation of passages from the Qu’ran and various Had’ith & Sunnah that 
5 It is also interesting to note that high-income countries demonstrate a life insurance penetration ten times as  
high as lower-middle income countries and a life insurance density nearly one hundred times higher than low-
income countries.
6 Let us also note here that, wealthy countries also have larger bond markets and issue more equity and private 
bonds. Stock markets have soared in size, activity and efficiency over the last three decades owing to significant  
changes in higher GDP per capita countries. 
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are short texts regarding customs of the Muslim community and relating experiences of the 
prophet Mohammed(Pryor, 2007). These form the basis of Shari’ya law, that permeates all 
areas of the wider Islamic system, including economics, finance, law, politics and government 
and that have common values of Islamic social justice(Asutey,2007). The Islamic financial 
system is founded and regulated on the same Shari’ya principles as the overall economy and 
society (Iqbal, 1997). These govern the nature of contracts and the design of institutions to 
guide  the  market  and  regulation  of  participants’  behavior.  Hence,  individuals  within  an 
Islamic  financial  system  will  be  subject  to  behavioral  norms,  which  give  rise  to  very 
heterogeneous assumptions to those that form the foundation of regulation in western markets. 
In the last strand,  we highlight a case for the choice of press-freedom instrumental 
variables. From a theoretical standpoint, press-freedom and the Efficiency Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) of finance move hand-in-hand. Empirically, freedom of the press is one of the major  
efficient market channels and only with unrestricted press-freedom can information be rapidly 
spread and fully incorporated into asset prices (Guo-Ping, 2008). 
2.2 Mobile penetration in Africa 
Borrowing from Mbiti &  Weil (2011), the story of the growth of mobile phones in 
Africa  is  one  of  a  tectonic  and unexpected  change  in  communications  technology.  From 
virtually unconnected in the 1990s, over 60% of Africa now has mobile phone coverage and 
there are now over ten times as many mobiles as landline phones in use (Aker & Mbiti, 2010). 
In line with Aker & Mbiti(2010), mobile phone coverage in Africa has grown at staggering 
rates over the past decade. In 1999, only 11% of the African population had mobile phone 
coverage, primarily in Northern (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) and Sothern 
Africa (Kenya and South Africa).  By 2008, 60% of the population (477 million) could get a 
signal and an area of 11.2 million square kilometers had mobile phone coverage: equivalent to 
the United Sates  and Argentina  combined.  By the  turn of  2012,  it  is  projected that  most 
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villages in Africa will have coverage with only a handful of countries relatively unconnected. 
Borrowing  from  Demombynes,  &  Thegeya,  (2012),  Kenya  has  undergone  a  remarkable 
information and communication technology (ICT) revolution. At the turn of the 1990s, less 
than 3% of Kenyan households owned a telephone and less than 1 in 1000 Kenyan adults had 
mobile phone service. However, by the end of 2011, 93 percent of Keynan households owned 
a mobile phone. This soar is largely credited to the M-PESA mobile-banking network.
Banks are recognizing  the potential  of reaching millions  of prospective customers, 
especially the rural population who account for more than 60% of Africa’s total population 
and have no access to banking services (Ondiege, 2010). The rural commercial bank branch 
network is yet underdeveloped. However since above 50% of the adult population in Africa 
has access to GSMs, mobile  banking could enable the rural  population to have access to 
financial services as demonstrated by the cases of Kenya and South Africa. The cost of formal 
banking in Africa is quite high: in some countries, the minimum deposit can be as high as 
50% of per capita GDP. More so, internet and broadband subscription are still low, making 
internet banking out of reach for most of the population. In this regard, mobile banking can be 
used to provide financial services to the unbanked. Financial institutions and ‘mobile phone’ 
service  providers  are  introducing  resourceful  methods  of  bringing  these  ‘unserved’ 
populations  into  the  formal  economy using  mobile  phones.  As  concerns  banks,  the  main 
advantages  of the mobile  phone lie  in  its  capacities  to  reach everywhere.  Its  power is  in 
transforming the economics of service delivery,  especially by mitigating costs of financial 
transactions. Mobile banking is a powerful means of delivering savings services to the billions 
of people worldwide who have a  cell  phone but  not  a  bank account.  It  has  a  number  of 
advantages over traditional banking methods as it breaks down geographical constraints; it 
also offers other advantages such as immediacy, efficiency and security. 
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2.3 Scope and positioning of the paper
The proliferation  of  mobile  money in Africa  has  generated  research attempting  to 
explain the roots of the phenomenon as well as understanding its effects. Existing literature 
has focused on the rapid growth of mobile money(Kimenyi & Ndung’u,2009)7, arguing that 
the initial success of the mobile money transfer industry can be attributed to the high demand 
for remittances generated by rural/urban migration(Comninos et al.,2008) and its rapid scaling 
is due to mobile providers growth strategy(Jack & Suri, 2011). Other papers have examined 
the economic impact of mobile  banking (Jonathan & Camilo,  2008; Aker & Mbiti,  2010; 
Mbiti & Weil, 2011). For the most part these studies in Africa have been country-specific 
(Mbiti & Weil, 2011; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012), based on micro-data (Mbiti & Weil, 
2011; Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012) and greased with theoretical postulations (Porteous, 
2006; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008;  Ondiege, 2010; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012) without 
empirical  backing.  No  wonder,  Maurer  (2008)  earlier  lamented  the  scarcity  of  empirical 
research focusing on the adoption and socioeconomic impacts of m-banking (payments). 
At the Connect Africa summit in 2007, Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda asserted: 
“in ten short years, what was once an object of luxury and privilege, the ‘mobile phone’ has  
become a basic necessity in Africa”(Aker & Mbiti,2010,208). An article in  The Economist 
(2008) also reported: “a device that was a yuppie toy not so long ago has now become a  
potent for economic development in the world’s poorest countries”. This paper seeks to assess 
if these sentiments and slogans reflect the reality of the consequences of mobile phone on 
financial development in Africa?
Beyond, the need to investigate these perceptions, there is a growing body of work 
pointing to the imperative of more scholarly research on a phenomenon whose time is now: 
mobile penetration. To the best of our knowledge, one of the most exhaustive accounts on the 
7 They  attribute  the  rapid  growth  in  mobile  money  in  Kenya  to  four  factors:  a  conducive  legal  and  tax 
environment, private-public policy dialogue, strategic and prudent macroeconomic policies, and a guarantee for 
the existence of a contestable market discouraging dominance by initial entrants.
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‘mobile phone’ development literature concludes: “Existing empirical evidence on the effect  
of mobile phone coverage and services suggest that the mobile phone can potentially serve as  
a tool for economic development in Africa. But this evidence while certainly encouraging  
remains limited. First, while economic studies have focused on the effects of mobile phones  
for particular countries or markets, there is little evidence showing that this has translated  
into macroeconomic gains…”(Aker & Mbiti,2010,224). Also, as postulated by Maurer (2008) 
and confirmed in subsequent literature (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Thacker & Wright,2012), 
scholarly  research  on  the  adoption  and  socioeconomic  impacts  of  m-banking(payments) 
systems in the developing world is scares. From a broad perspective, most studies on mobile-
banking have been theoretical and qualitative in nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 
2008; Merritt, 2010; Thacker & Wright, 2012). The few existing empirical studies hinge on 
country-specific and micro-level data(collected from surveys) for the most part(Demombynes 
& Thegeya ,2012). 
In  this  paper  we  assess  what  incidence  mobile  banking  has  had  on  financial 
development.  By  distinguishing  its  effect  on  formal  and  informal  financial  intermediary 
sectors,  findings  could  be  of  substantial  policy  relevance;  especially  on  mastering  which 
financial sectors are benefiting most owing to the soaring phenomenon of mobile banking. 
Previous  research  on  the  mobile-finance  nexus  has  been  country-specific  and  limited  to 
micro-economic data (Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012). Hence the seminal character of this 
work  also  adds  to  the  literature  by  proposing  some  hitherto  unexplored  dimensions  of 
financial development. Hence it provides new indicators as well as the much needed guidance 
to policy makers on the financial empirics of  ‘mobile banking’. In summary, our contribution 
to the literature is threefold. Firstly, we complement existing theoretical literature on mobile 
banking by providing the first macroeconomic empirical assessment of the incidence of the 
phenomenon on financial development. Secondly, owing to the debate over which financial 
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sectors  are  benefiting  most  from mobile  banking,  we  assess  its  impact  by  disentangling 
financial depth to integrate a previously missing component. Hence we are able to capture 
both formal and informal financial intermediary development effects. Thirdly, based on the 
findings, we provide relevant measures that could guide future search and macroeconomic 
policy. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data
We examine a  sample of 52 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators  (ADI)  and  the  Financial  Development  and  Structure  Database  (FDSD)  of  the 
World  Bank  (WB).  Freedom indicators  originate  from Freedom House  while  the  mobile 
penetration measure is obtained from the African Development Bank (AfDB). In line with 
existing literature we proxy for ‘mobile banking/activities’ with the ‘mobile penetration’ rate 
(Ondiege, 2010; Aker & Mbiti, 2010). Owing to constraints in the time series properties of the 
mobile penetration measurement, data structure is cross-sectional and consists of 2003-2009 
average growth rates. While formal financial intermediary development indicators are directly 
extracted from the FDSD, semi-formal and informal financial indicators are computed from 
the FDSD in  line  with  propositions  from Asongu (2011a).  Instrumental  variables  include 
legal-origins,  religious-dominations,  income-levels  and press-freedom qualities  as  justified 
theoretically  in  Section  2.1.2.  These  instruments  have  been  largely  documented  in 
development  literature  (Beck  et  al.,  2003; Stulz  &  Williamson,  2003)  as  well  as  recent 
African growth (Agbor, 2011) and finance literature (Asongu, 2011bcde). Summary statistics 
with presentation of countries (Appendix 1), correlation analysis (Appendix 2) and definition 
of variables (Appendix 3) are detailed in the appendices.
In a bid for clarity in presentation, we classify selected variables into two main strands 
below. 
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3.1.1 Financial intermediary development 
a) Financial depth
Borrowing from the FDSD and recent African finance literature (Asongu, 2011bcd), 
this  paper  measures  financial  depth from two standpoints:  overall-economic  and financial 
system perspectives with indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system 
deposits  (Fdgdp)  respectively.  While  the former  denotes  the monetary base plus  demand, 
saving and time deposits, the later indicates liquid liabilities. Since we are dealing exclusively 
with  developing countries,  we distinguish  liquid  liabilities  from money supply because  a 
substantial chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector (Asongu, 
2011bc).  The two indicators are in ratios of GDP (see Appendix 3) and both can robustly 
cross-check  each  other  as  either  account  for  over  97% of  information  in  the  other  (see 
Appendix 2).
b) Financial efficiency
By financial intermediation efficiency here, this study neither refers to a profitability-
oriented concept nor to  the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial 
sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: DEA). What we seek to highlight is the ability of 
banks to  effectively fulfill  their  fundamental  role  of  transforming mobilized  deposits  into 
credit for economic operators (agents). We adopt proxies for banking-system-efficiency and 
financial-system-efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial 
system  credit  on  financial  system  deposits: Fcfd’).  Like  with  financial  depth,  these  two 
financial allocation efficiency proxies can cross-check each other as they represent more than 
83% of variability in one another (see Appendix 2).
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c) Financial size
With  respect  to  the  FDSD we measure  financial  intermediary  size  as  the  ratio  of 
“deposit bank assets” to “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit 
bank assets: Dbacba). 
d) Financial activity
By financial  intermediary activity here,  the work highlights the ability of banks to 
grant credit to economic operators.  We proxy for both banking system intermediary activity 
and financial  system intermediary activity with “private domestic  credit  by deposit  banks: 
Pcrb”  and  “private  credit  by  domestic  banks  and  other  financial  institutions:  Pcrbof” 
respectively.  The later measure cross-checks the former as it represents more than 92% of 
information in the former (see Appendix 2).
e) Formal, informal and semi-formal financial developments
In  line  with  Asongu(2011a):  formal  financial  development  is  the  ratio  of  bank 
deposits(liabilities)8 on  GDP(or  M2)  in  absolute  (or  relative)  terms;  absolute informal 
financial development(Informal 1) is measured as the difference between money supply(M2) 
and  financial  system  deposits9 in  percentage  of  GDP;  relative informal  financial 
development(Informal 2)10 is measured as the difference between money supply and financial 
system deposits in percentage of M2; informal and semi-formal financial development11 is the 
difference between M2 and bank deposits as a percentage of M2.
8 Bank deposits here refer to demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks. See Lines 24 and 25 of  
International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS);  October  2008  for  the  definition  of  formal  financial  intermediary 
development. 
9 Financial  deposits  are  demand,  time  and  saving  deposits  in  deposit  money  banks  and  other  financial  
institutions. See Lines 24, 25 and 45 of IFS, October, 2008. 
10 This is a measure of sector importance in financial development. That is, from  formal  and  semi-formal to 
‘informal’ financial development: (Informalization). This proposition appreciates the deterioration of the formal 
and semi-formal banking sectors to the benefit of the informal sector. See Asongu (2011a). 
11 This is also a measure of sector importance in financial development. That is, from formal to ‘semi-formal and 
informal’  financial development: (Semi-informalisation and informalization). This proposition appreciates the 
deterioration of the formal banking sector to the benefit of other sectors (informal and semi-formal). See Asongu 
(2011a).
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3.1.2 Other variables 
Control  exogenous  variables  include  economic  considerations  of  inflation  and 
economic prosperity (GDP growth). Only two control variables are used owing to constraints 
in  the  Overidentifying  restrictions  (OIR)  Sargan-test  for  instrument  validity  in  the 
Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation approach12.
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Endogeneity 
Aker & Mbiti(2010;225) state: “But while these studies provide some evidence of the  
positive  relationship  between  mobile  phones  and  economic  growth,  they  are  plagued  by  
endogeneity  problems.  Mobile  penetration  rates  are  subject  to  significant  measurement  
errors, leading to potential bias in the coefficient estimates”. Also, while mobile phones have 
a bearing on financial development the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out, as some banking-
service applications in the financial industry may require the use of mobile phones. We are 
thus confronted here with an issue of endogeneity owing to reverse-causality and omitted 
variables, since mobile banking is correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. To 
address this issue we employ an estimation technique that takes account of the endogeneity 
issue. 
3.2.2 Estimation technique 
Given the concern for endogeneity,  we borrow from Beck et  al.(2003) and recent 
African finance literature(Asongu, 2011de) by adopting a Two-Stage-Least-Squares(TSLS) 
estimation  approach.  Instrumental  Variable  (IV)  estimation  addresses  the  puzzle  of 
endogeneity and hence avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least 
12 An OIR restrictions test to examine instrument validity is only possible in the presence of over-identification.  
That is, the instruments must be greater  than the endogenous explaining variables by at least  one degree of 
freedom. In cases of exact-identification (instruments=endogenous explaining variables) and under-identification 
(instruments <endogenous explaining variables), this OIR-Sargan test is not applicable. 
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Squares (OLS) when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error term in the main 
equation.  The TSLS-IV estimation method adopted by this study will  entail  the following 
steps.
First-stage regression: 
++= itit nlegaloriginelMobileChan )(10 γγ +itreligion)(2γ itlincomeleve )(3γ                        
                               itompressfreed )(4γ+ υα ++ itiX                                               (1) 
                                                                                                      
Second-stage regression:
++= itit MobileFinance )(10 γγ +itiXβ   µ                                                          (2)
The independent control variables are represented by X in the two equations. In Eq.(1) 
and  Eq.(2),  v  and u  respectively denote the disturbance terms. Legal-origins, dominant-
religions,  income-levels  and  press-freedom  qualities  represent  the  instruments.  ‘Mobile 
penetration’ and ‘financial development dynamics’ are the endogenous variables in the first 
and second equations respectively. 
In the specification of the models, we lay emphasis on the following:  (1) verify the 
instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining variables, conditional 
on other covariates (control variables); (2) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated 
with the error-term in the main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test.
3.2.3 Robustness checks
For  robustness  purposes,  the  empirical  analysis:  (1)  uses  alternative  measures  of 
financial  development;  (2)  employs  two  distinct  interchangeable  sets  of  instruments;  (3) 
accounts for endogeneity; (4) models with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
(HAC) standard errors. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Presentation of results 
This empirical  section addresses two main issues: (1) the ability of the exogenous 
components of mobile banking to explain financial intermediary development dynamics and; 
(2) the ability of the instruments to account for financial intermediary development dynamics 
beyond the mobile banking channel. To make theses assessments, we employ the TSLS-IV 
estimation  approach  with  legal-origins,  income-levels,  religious-dominations  and  press-
freedom  qualities  as  instrumental  variables.  While  the  first  issue  is  addressed  by  the 
significance of estimated coefficients, the second is contingent on results of the Sargan-OIR 
test. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the position that, the instruments do not explain 
financial development dynamics beyond the mobile banking channel. Hence a rejection of the 
null hypothesis is a rejection of the stance that the instruments explain financial development 
dynamics only through the mobile banking channel. In other words, this rejection questions 
the validity of the instruments and substance of the mobile banking channel in accounting for 
cross-country variations in financial intermediary dynamics. While Table 1 entails regressions 
of traditional financial intermediary dynamics of depth, activity,  efficiency and size on the 
mobile banking channel, Table 2 reflects the mobile-finance nexus with measures of financial 
sector importance. The imperative here is to examine how the phenomenon of mobile banking 
is playing-out in the development of formal, semi-formal and informal financial intermediary 
sectors. For both tables, regressions are; (1) performed with and without HAC standard errors 
and; (2) duplicated with the robust set of instruments(and the same results are found).  
Table  1  below  assesses  the  impact  of  mobile  banking  on  traditional  financial 
intermediary dynamics. While Panel A, is not robust to HAC standard errors, Panel B is. The 
first  issue  which  is  addressed  by  the  significance  of  estimated  coefficients  is  valid  for 
financial  intermediary dynamics  of  depth,  activity  and size.  The negative  mobile  banking 
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elasticities  of  finance  point  to  the  deterioration  of  the  traditional  financial  intermediary 
dynamics owing to the phenomenon of mobile penetration. This negative incidence is more 
pronounced  in  financial  system  activity  than  in  banking  system  activity  and  also  more 
witnessed in financial system deposits than in economic financial depth. Two facts explain 
these disparities in weight of elasticities. (1) Mobile-banking has a greater negative incidence 
on ‘financial system activity’ than ‘banking system activity’ because the former entails the 
semi-formal banking activity which should  also be negatively affected by the phenomenon. 
The interpretation is valid on the condition that, the phenomenon also negatively affects semi-
formal financial intermediation activity (the difference between financial system activity and 
banking system activity). This is only logical because semi-formal finance according to the 
IFS (2008) definition of the financial system entails specialized non-bank and other financial 
institutions  like  rural  banks,  post  banks,  credit  unions…etc.  From intuition  and common-
sense, mobile banking should therefore negatively impinge on semi-formal banking activities 
because of their quasi-formal settings. In plainer terms, credit (financial activity) allocated by 
the semi-formal financial sector also reduces owing to mobile banking. (2) Financial system 
depth is more negatively affected by mobile banking than economic financial depth. This is 
only logical from common-sense and theoretical postulations elucidated at the first phase of 
this paper. Economic financial depth is overall money supply (M2) and is made-up of the 
financial system’s depth (formal and semi-formal depths) as well as the informal financial 
sector depth (which is a great chunk of the monetary base: M0, in developing countries) that  
does not transit through the banks and other financial institutions recognized by the financial 
system(IFS,2008).  Hence  it  is  only  logical  that,  mobile-penetration  has  a  less  negative 
incidence  on  overall  economic  financial  depth.  Another  supposition  resulting  from  this 
interpretation is the fact that, the less negative incidence on overall economic financial depth 
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attests to a hypothetical positive incidence of mobile banking on the informal financial sector 
(which is still not a component of the financial system according to the IFS, 2008 definition). 
The second issue is addressed by the Sargan OIR test, overwhelming failure to reject 
the null hypothesis of this test points to the validity of the instruments and suggests that they 
(instruments) do not explain the financial intermediary dynamics beyond the mobile banking 
channel. With respect to both issues, results of Panel A are robust to those of Panel B.
Note should be taken of the fact that, Table 1 is based on the IFS(2008) definition of  
the financial system which is comprised of only the formal banking system and other financial 
institutions(semi-formal  banking  sector).  Regressions  in  Table  2  however,  relax  the  IFS 
(2008) assumption  and integrate  a  previously missing  component  of  the  financial  system 
(informal  sector)  into  the  conception  and definition  of  the  financial  system;  in  line  with 
Asongu, (2011a). This redefinition of the financial  system is premised on two counts:  (1) 
theoretically, the growing phenomenon of mobile-banking is escaping the grasp of the formal 
and semi-formal financial sectors; (2) empirically our findings in Table 1 fail to demonstrate a 
positive mobile-finance nexus, which logically implies, the phenomenon may be positively 
captured by a missing component in the IFS (2008) conception and definition of the financial 
system.
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Table 1: Impact of mobile banking on traditional financial intermediary dynamics 
Panel A: Regressions without HAC Standard Errors















Constant 1.142*** 1.458*** 1.593 2.635*** 1.343*** 2.018*** 2.041***
(1.142) (0.000) (0.201) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Mobile Banking  -0.502** -0.729*** -0.291 -1.218 -0.656*** -1.029*** -0.738***
(0.023) (0.000) (0.569) (0.161) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
Inflation -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.048 -0.009 -0.012 -0.0001
 (0.890) (0.972) (  0.360) (0.228) (0.305) (0.398) (0.408)
GDP Growth --- --- -0.066 0.103 --- --- 0.0004
(0.741) (0.594) (0.996)
Sargan -OIR 5.499 5.899 2.400 3.262 7.052 5.545 2.090
(0.239) (0.206) (0.493) (0.352) (0.133) (0.235) (0.553)
Adjusted R² 0.068 0.212 -0.022 -0.028 0.251 0.212 0.089
Fisher 2.577* 6.105*** 0.624 1.541 6.582*** 6.139*** 3.119**
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Instruments Constant, Lower Middle Income, Middle Income, English, Christian, Free, Partially Free.
Robust instruments Constant, Upper Middle Income, Low Income, French, Islam, Not Free.
Panel A: Regressions with HAC Standard Errors















Constant 1.142** 1.458*** 1.593 2.635 1.343*** 2.018** 2.041***
(0.027) (0.000) (0.153) (0.100) (0.001) (0.024) (0.000)
Mobile Banking  -0.502* -0.729*** -0.291 -1.218 -0.656*** -1.029** -0.738***
(0.077) (0.001) (0.583) (0.288) (0.004) (0.036) (0.000)
Inflation -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.048 -0.009 -0.012 -0.0001
 (0.874) (0.966) (0.180) (0.155) (0.181) (0.280) (0.426)
GDP Growth --- --- -0.066 0.103 --- --- 0.0004
(0.589) (0.535) (0.995)
Sargan -OIR 5.499 5.899 2.400 3.262 7.052 5.545 2.090
(0.239) (0.206) (0.493) (0.352) (0.133) (0.235) (0.553)
Adjusted R² 0.068 0.212 -0.022 -0.028 0.251 0.212 0.089
Fisher 1.677 5.583*** 0.800 0.976 4.019** 2.194 5.586***
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Instruments Constant, Lower Middle Income, Middle Income, English, Christians, Free, Partially Free.
Robust instruments Constant, Upper Middle Income, Low Income, French, Islam, Not Free.
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. Fin: Financial. Sys: System. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Consistent. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions. P-values in brackets
Table 2 below is based on the Asongu (2011a) definition of the financial system which 
integrates  the previously missing informal  financial  sector component  into the IFS (2008) 
definition. Instead of using traditional indicators of financial development based on dynamics 
of depth, efficiency, activity and size as captured by Table 1, we employ measures of sector 
importance. Hence we distinguish between the formal, semi-formal and informal sectors. We 
use two indicators of informal finance (absolute and relative measures) to distinguish between 
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the growth in absolute terms of the informal sector (Informal 1) conditional on GDP and 
relative  growth  of  the  informal  sector  (Informal  2)  contingent  on  M2.  Hence  the  later 
measures the relative importance of the informal sector with respect to the two other sectors, 
encapsulated in the IFS, (2008) definition. In other words,  Informal 2 appreciates how the 
informal  financial  sector  evolves  at  the  expense  of  the  formal  and  semi-formal  financial 
sectors. The last indicator (Informal & Semiformal) appreciates the extent to which informal 
and semi-informal finance progresses to the detriment of the formal banking sector. While the 
2nd to the 5th columns of Table 2 are TSLS-IV regressions without HAC standard errors, the 6th 
to the 9th columns reflect their counterparts with HAC standard errors. 
Like in the previous table, two main issues outlined in the introduction of this section 
are assessed. Looking at the first concern, the following could be noticed. (1) Mobile-banking 
has a positive incidence  on informal  financial  development;  both in  absolute  and relative 
terms.  Its  positive  elasticity  with  respect  to  the  absolute  measure  (Informal  1)  is  less 
pronounced than that in respect of the relative indicator (Informal 2). A logical deduction is 
that, the informal sector grows more owing to improvements of M2 than in GDP growth. 
Hence growth of the informal sector is more pronounced at the expense of the formal and 
semi-formal sectors (constituents of M2) than to the detriment of many other macroeconomic 
variables (constituents of GDP). Plainly put, the share of informal finance is more relevant in 
M2 growth than in GDP growth. (2) The mobile-banking elasticity of ‘informal and semi-
formal financial development’ (0.854) is higher than that of ‘informal financial development’ 
(0.853). A logical interpretation that follows is that, financial deposits (depth) of the semi-
formal financial institutions increase only by a thin margin owing to mobile banking. (3) The 
incidence of mobile  banking on formal  financial  development has the right negative sign, 
albeit not significant. This broadly confirms the results in Table 1.  However note should be 
taken of the fact that, the  formal banking sector of Table 2 entails only bank deposits(depth), 
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while the financial depth of Table 1 is made-up of financial system deposits. This difference 
therefore partly elucidates the insignificance of the negative sign. 
With regard to the second concern, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan-
OIR  test  in  all  regressions  point  to  the  validity  of  the  instruments.  It  follows  that  the 
instruments explain indicators of financial sector importance through no other mechanisms 
than the mobile banking channel. Ultimately the instruments are not correlated with the error 
term in the equation of interest and hence do not suffer from endogeneity. The regressions are 
duplicated with the second set of robust instruments and the same findings are noticed.
Table 2: Impact of mobile banking on financial sector importance measures 









Formal Informal 2 Informal & 
Semiformal
Constant -0.304*** 1.667** -1.253*** -1.244*** -0.304 1.667*** -1.253*** -1.244***
(0.005) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.123) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Mobile Banking  0.233*** -0.617 0.853*** 0.854*** 0.233*** -0.617 0.853*** 0.854***
(0.000) (0.112) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.130) (0.002) (0.001)
Inflation -0.0008 0.003 -0.011 -0.008 -0.0008 0.003 -0.011 -0.008
 (0.765) (0.861) (0.347) (0.470) (0.674) (0.838) (0.168) (0.283)
GDP Growth -0.004 -0.079 0.028 0.023 -0.004 -0.079 0.028 0.023
(0.792) (0.452) (0.697) (0.745) (0.794) (0.490) (0.589) (0.629)
Sargan -OIR 0.545 1.430 1.414 1.483 0.545 1.430 1.414 1.483
(0.908) (0.698) (0.702) (0.686) (0.908) (0.698) (0.702) (0.686)
Adjusted R² 0.310 0.021 0.174 0.182 0.310 0.021 0.174 0.182
Fisher 5.194*** 1.559 4.608*** 4.623*** 3.030** 2.528* 12.666*** 11.100***
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Instruments Constant, Lower Middle Income, Middle Income, English, Christians, Free, Partially Free. 
Robust 
Instruments 
Constant, Upper Middle Income, Low Income, French, Islam, Not Free 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. OIR: 
Overidentifying Restrictions.  P-values in brackets. 
4.2 Further discussion of results, policy implications and future directions  
Before we delve into further discussion of the results, it is imperative to outline the 
intuition  motivating  this  paper.  (1)  Some  voices  have  expressed  sentiments  on  the 
instrumentality  of  mobile-phones  in  African  development  (The Economist,  2008;  Aker  & 
Mbiti, 2010, 208). This paper has assessed if these sentiments and slogans are material with 
respect to financial development. (2) “The existing empirical evidence on the effect of mobile  
phone coverage and services suggest that the mobile phone can potentially serve as a tool for  
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economic  development  in  Africa.  But  this  evidence  while  certainly  encouraging  remains  
limited.  First,  while  economic  studies  have  focused  on  the  effects  of  mobile  phones  for  
particular countries or markets, there is little evidence showing that this has translated into  
macroeconomic gains…”(Aker & Mbiti,2010,224). (3)As postulated by Maurer (2008) and 
confirmed  in  subsequent  literature  (Jonathan & Camilo,  2008;  Thacker  & Wright,  2012), 
scholarly research on the adoption and socioeconomic impacts of m-banking systems in the 
developing world is scares. From a broad perspective, most studies on mobile banking have 
been theoretical and qualitative in nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 
2010; Thacker & Wright, 2012). The few existing empirical studies hinge on country-specific 
and micro-level data(collected from surveys) for the most part(Demombynes & Thegeya ,
2012). 
In this paper we have assessed what incidence mobile banking has had on financial 
development.  By  distinguishing  its  effect  on  formal  and  informal  financial  intermediary 
sectors, findings have been of substantial policy relevance as to which financial sectors are 
benefiting most owing to the soaring phenomenon of mobile banking. Previous research on 
the  mobile-finance  nexus  has  been  country-specific  and  limited  to  micro-economic  data 
(Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012). Beyond the use of macroeconomic variables, the seminal 
character  of  this  work has  added to the literature  by proposing some hitherto  unexplored 
dimensions of financial development which could  provided the much needed guidance to 
policy makers  on the financial  empirics  of  mobile  banking.  Our contribution  to  existing 
literature has been threefold. Firstly, we have complemented existing theoretical literature on 
the mobile-finance nexus by providing the first macroeconomic empirical assessment of the 
incidence of ‘mobile banking’ on financial development. Secondly, owing to the debate over 
which financial sectors are benefiting most from mobile banking, we have assessed its impact 
by disentangling financial depth to include a previously missing component. Hence we have 
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been able to capture both formal and informal financial  intermediary development effects. 
Thirdly,  based on the findings, we will provide relevant policy measures that could guide 
future search and macroeconomic policy.
In  this  first empirical  assessment  of  the  incidence  of  mobile  banking on financial 
intermediary development in Africa, we have used two definitions of the financial system: the 
traditional  IFS (2008) and Asongu (2011a)  measures  of financial  sector  importance.  Two 
broad findings have been established. (1) When the financial system is based only on banks 
and  other  financial  institution  (IFS,  2008),  mobile  banking  has  a  negative  incidence  on 
traditional financial intermediary dynamics of depth, activity and size. (2) However, when a 
previously  missing  informal-financial  sector  component  is  integrated  into  the  definition 
(Asongu, 2011a), mobile banking has a positive incidence on informal financial intermediary 
development. Mobile banking is therefore a powerful means of delivering savings services to 
the millions of people in Africa who have a cell phone but not a bank account. It has a number 
of advantages over traditional banking methods as it breaks down geographical constraints; it 
also offers other advantages such as immediacy,  efficiency and security.  This could partly 
explain  the  reason  the  incidence  of  the  phenomenon  has  been  positive  for  the  informal 
financial sector to the detriment of the formal banking system. 
Three  major  implications  result  from the  findings.  (1)  There  is  a  growing role  of 
informal finance in developing countries. (2) The incidence of a burgeoning phenomenon of 
mobile  banking  cannot  be  effectively  assessed  at  a  macroeconomic  level  by  traditional 
financial development indicators. (3) It is a wake-up call for scholarly research on informal 
financial intermediary development indicators which will oriented monetary policy; since a 
great chunk of the monetary base(M0) in less developed countries is now captured by mobile 
banking(informal financial activities).
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Beside  rethinking  monetary  policy transmission  mechanisms,  other  future  research 
directions could include: (1) ascertaining whether and how mobile phones can lead to poverty 
reduction through growth and financial development; (2) an assessment of short, medium and 
long-term incidences of mobile phones on financial development is also worthy of note; (3) 
consequences of regulation on mobile banking; (4) last but not the least, monetary policy tools 
that could fight inflation resulting from mobile banking activities. 
5. Conclusion
In  the first  empirical  assessment  of  the  incidence  of  mobile  banking  on financial 
intermediary development in  Africa, we have used two definitions of the financial system: 
the traditional IFS (2008) and Asongu (2011a) measures of financial sector importance. When 
the financial system is based only on banks and other financial institution (IFS, 2008), mobile 
banking has a negative incidence on traditional  financial  intermediary dynamics  of depth, 
activity and size. However, when a previously missing informal-financial sector component is 
integrated into the definition (Asongu, 2011a), mobile-banking has a positive incidence on 
informal  financial  intermediary  development.  Three  major  implications  result  from  the 
findings. (1) There is a growing role of informal finance in developing countries. (2) The 
incidence of a burgeoning phenomenon of mobile banking cannot be effectively assessed at a 
macroeconomic level by traditional financial development indicators. (3) It is a wake-up call 
for scholarly research on informal financial intermediary development indicators which will 
oriented monetary policy; since a great chunk of the monetary base(M0) in less developed 
countries is now captured by mobile banking(informal financial activities).
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries
Panel   A: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser.
Financial 
Depth 
Economic System Depth(M2) 0.339 0.242 0.079 1.022 44
Financial System Depth(Fdgdp) 0.273 0.226 0.042 0.895 44
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking System Efficiency(BcBd) 0.706 0.344 0.252 2.249 51
Financial System Efficiency(FcFd) 0.712 0.382 0.259 2.458 35
Financial 
Activity 
Banking System Activity(Pcrb) 0.185 0.175 0.027 0.715 44
Financial System Activity(Pcrbof) 0.208 0.244 0.027 1.423 44
Financial Size Financial System Size(Dbacba) 0.765 0.210 0.063 1.074 51
Formal F.D Banking System Deposits(Bdgdp) 0.271 0.225 0.042 0.892 44
Informal F.D 1 Absolute Informal  F.D 0.066 0.054 -0.145 0.217 44
Informal F.D 2 Relative Informal F.D 0.239 0.173 -0.336 0.727 44
Informal  & Semi-
formal 
Relative Informal and Semi-formal 
F.D Development
0.246 0.173 -0.336 0.727 44
Mobile Phone  Penetration 1.674 0.217 1.043 2.242 52
Inflation 117.95 764.60 1.953 5304.8 44
GDP growth 4.760 3.087 -6.959 12.894 50
Instrumental 
Variables 
English Common  law 0.384 0.491 0.000 1.000 52
French  Civil law 0.615 0.491 0.000 1.000 52
Christian 0.615 0.491 0.000 1.000 52
Islam 0.384 0.491 0.000 1.000 52
Upper Middle Income 0.192 0.397 0.000 1.000 52
Lower Middle Income 0.230 0.425 0.000 1.000 52
Low Income 0.576 0.498 0.000 1.000 52
Middle Income 0.423 0.498 0.000 1.000 52
Total Freedom 0.163 0.346 0.000 1.000 52
Partial Freedom 0.362 0.432 0.000 1.000 52
No Freedom 0.474 0.473 0.000 1.000 52
Panel B: Presentation of Countries
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,  
Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon,  The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal,  
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, Comoros.
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min:Minimum.  Max: Maximum.  Obser.:Observations. F.D: Financial Development. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation analysis 










SemiformalM2gdp Fdgdp Bdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba
1.000 0.974 0.974 -0.124 0.042 0.750 0.577 0.281 0.399 -0.361 -0.364 -0.496 -0.092 -0.234 M2gdp
1.000 0.999 -0.064 0.169 0.825 0.695 0.360 0.185 -0.534 -0.536 -0.590 -0.054 -0.208 Fdgdp
1.000 -0.062 0.166 0.824 0.694 0.362 0.186 -0.532 -0.538 -0.593 -0.055 -0.210 Bdgdp
1.000 0.837 0.359 0.349 0.313 -0.282 -0.135 -0.156 -0.239 -0.045 -0.072 BcBd
1.000 0.589 0.772 0.372 -0.531 -0.476 -0.461 -0.243 -0.194 -0.116 FcFd
1.000 0.922 0.447 -0.083 -0.590 -0.597 -0.586 -0.151 -0.197 Pcrb
1.000 0.382 -0.312 -0.654 -0.652 -0.551 -0.123 -0.185 Pcrbof
1.000 -0.238 -0.567 -0.585 -0.352 -0.160 0.171 Dbacba
1.000 0.605 0.596 0.238 -0.185 -0.177 Informal 1
1.000 0.983 0.477 -0.213 -0.048 Informal 2
1.000 0.492 -0.208 -0.039 Inf & Semi
1.000 -0.031 0.255 Mobile P.
1.000 -0.569 Inflation
1.000 GDP growth
M2gdp: Economic financial depth. Fdgdp: Financial system depth. Bdgdp: Banking system depth . BcBd: Banking system efficiency. FcFd: Financial system efficiency. Pcrb: Banking system activity. Pcrb: Financial 
system activity. Dbacba: Financial system size. Informal 1: Absolute informal financial development.  Informal 2: Relative informal financial development.  F.D: Financial Development. Fin: Financial. 
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources
Economic Financial Depth  M2 Money supply(% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Financial System Depth  Fdgdp Liquid liabilities(% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Banking System Depth Bdgdp Banking  deposits(% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Banking System Efficiency  BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank(FDSD)
Financial System Efficiency FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank(FDSD)
Banking  System Activity Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks(% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other 
financial institutions(% of GDP)
World Bank(FDSD)
Financial Size  Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit 
bank assets
World Bank(FDSD)
Absolute Informal FD Informal 1 M2-Fd(% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Relative Informal FD Informal 2 M2-Fd(% of M2) World Bank(FDSD)





M2-Bd(% of M2) World Bank(FDSD)
Mobile Phone Penetration Mobpen Seven year average growth rate(% of population) AfDB
Inflation Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Economic Prosperity GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Freedom  Free Press Freedom Quality Freedom House
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  FD: Financial Development. AfDB: African Development 
Bank. Fd:Financial system deposits. Bd: Banking system deposits. M2: Money supply. 
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